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In Hawaiian tradition, admiration for a wise person is expressed using the
phrase "ka lama kii o ka no'eau," literally meaning "the standing torch of
wisdom."' This is indeed a fitting description of former Hawai'i Supreme
Court Chief Justice (CJ) William S. Richardson. Here at the law school that
bears his name and especially for those of us who have benefited from his
decisions-both in his role as ajurist and as a wise mentor and leader-the loss
of CJ Richardson's physical presence is deeply felt. Nowhere is CJ
Richardson's wisdom expressed with more eloquence and force than in the
opinions that he wrote over the course of his sixteen-year tenure on the bench.
His opinions reflect his humble background, his commitment to a more open
society with equal opportunity for Hawai'i's multi-ethnic population, and his
strong belief in looking to Hawai'i's rich past as a source of today's law.2
Born into a working-class Hawaiian, Chinese, and Caucasian family, CJ
Richardson understood social, economic, and political deprivations, and he
committed himself to social justice. A graduate of Roosevelt High School and
the University of Hawai'i, CJ Richardson left Hawai'i to attend law school at
the University of Cincinnati. After his return from service in World War II, CJ
Richardson aligned himself with the revitalized Democratic Party, helping in
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particular to mobilize the Hawaiian community in support of Democratic
candidates. He subsequently served as Chief Clerk of the State Senate and as
Lieutenant Governor. In 1966, Governor John A. Burns appointed him Chief
Justice of the Hawai'i Supreme Court where he served for the next sixteen
years. Throughout his career, CJ Richardson encouraged Native Hawaiians and
other under-represented groups to work within the legal system to bring about
positive change for all of Hawai'i's people.
CJ Richardson was a staunch advocate of an independent judiciary, even
authoring an article in the University of Hawai'i Law Review discussing his
views on judicial independence.3 Although he had many friends and
colleagues in the legislative and executive branches of government, he fiercely
defended the Supreme Court's authority to promulgate rules of practice and
procedure for the state courts and to regulate the admission of new lawyers. He
fought to ensure that judges were protected from undue political pressures,
which in his mind also meant guaranteeing that judges made a decent living.
During his tenure, CJ Richardson established a unified judiciary and oversaw
the implementation of the 1978 amendments to the Hawai'i State Constitution
that created both an Intermediate Court of Appeals and a new judicial selection
process.
In addition to his role as ajurist, CJ Richardson was an astute administrator.
One of his major efforts was to oversee the funding and construction of new
buildings for the judiciary-on O'ahu, Ka'ahumanu Hale to house the circuit
courts and Kauikeaouli Hale for the district courts. He also secured funding for
new judiciary buildings on the neighbor islands. The project closest to his
heart, however, was renovating Ali'i6lani Hale, the current Supreme Court
building. CJ Richardson clearly wanted to restore the building to its earlier
glory and to reclaim it for Hawai'i's people. After all, Ali'ialani Hale had been
the seat of the Hawaiian Kingdom's Legislative Assembly. Moreover, it was
from the steps of Ali'i6lani Hale that the provisional government had declared
the abrogation of the Hawaiian monarchy. It was thus particularly fitting that a
Native Hawaiian Chief Justice ensured that the building, and in many senses
the judiciary itself, would once again belong to the people of Hawai'i.
CJ Richardson mentored countless young attorneys, including the forty law
clerks who worked for him during his tenure on the court. As one of his law
clerks, I had the privilege of working closely with him for almost four years,
staying on past my initial one-year commitment to help with the expanding
caseload and as CJ sought to implement changes in the judiciary.
CJ Richardson gave his law clerks wide latitude to freely express their
opinions about cases, both before and after oral argument. Once the court had
See William S. Richardson, Judicial Independence: The Hawaii Experience, 2 U. HAw.
L. REv. 1 (1979).
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met and decided a case, CJ would call one of us into his chambers and say
something like, "Well, I think we're going to be in the majority on this one-
maybe even a unanimous one." He would outline his thinking on the case and
an exchange of ideas would follow; sometimes he would call two of his clerks
in to see which one was most interested in writing the decision. And then,
armed with general directions and principles, it was up to the law clerk to give
those ideas real meat in a decision. If, at any time during the drafting process, a
clerk was stuck, felt that perhaps the wrong decision was being made, or found
facts in the record that made it impossible to rule as CJ and the court wished,
CJ's door was always open. A first draft was often followed by a second and
third. You could always feel CJ's calm, but persistent, guidance.
Always generous with his time, CJ Richardson sat and talked to each of us
about the more mundane aspects of our lives as well as the big decisions we
had to make. CJ also allowed us great flexibility in our schedules. After
ensuring that there would be no conflicts, he let me work in my off hours on the
defense for those charged with federal trespass on the island of Kaho'olawe and
later allowed me to take a leave of absence to work at the 1978 Constitutional
Convention. One of my most memorable experiences was when he bundled a
group of Supreme Court clerks into his car to go to Ala Moana Park for the first
homecoming of the Hawaiian voyaging canoe, H6kile'a.
CJ took an ongoing interest in the lives and careers of his law clerks. He was
delighted when we succeeded and he comforted us when we did not. When
one of the clerks became a judge (as several did), ran for office, became a
partner in a law firm, or received recognition for community service, CJ
Richardson was there. With a wide grin and a gentle nod of his head, he let us
know how much he supported us and how proud he was of our
accomplishments.
Nothing is more striking about CJ Richardson's achievements than his
longstanding and continuing commitment to opening educational and
professional avenues for the islands' most disadvantaged groups. This
commitment led to the 1973 establishment of the law school that now bears his
name. He understood that those with the greatest stake in building a more just
and equitable society were often denied the opportunity to go to law school
because of the prohibitive cost and distance. Determined that all in Hawai'i
should have the chance to obtain an excellent legal education, he fought an
uphill battle over many years to create and help shape Hawai'i's only law
school.
Because of CJ Richardson's perseverance, nearly 2500 men and women-
many from underrepresented, minority, and Native Hawaiian communities-are
now practicing law in the public and private sectors, holding elected office,
leading community and legal services organizations, teaching law, and serving
in the judiciary.
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In 1966, as he was beginning his tenure on the Supreme Court, CJ
Richardson reflected on his new role as a jurist:
The man who is Chief Justice must balance the rules of the past to conform with
the state of society today .... He must bring the old rules in line with modem
times. He must remember that those rules were made under a different structure.
He must live in the past-but not only the past. He must adopt the fundamental
principles of the past and bring them into focus with the present. And in Hawaii,
the present-like the past-is a time of migration.4
For CJ Richardson, the past included more than the principles of Anglo-
American law; it also included the principles of Hawaiian custom and tradition.
For him, the past, present, and future all encompassed concern for the common
person and for the dispossessed and disadvantaged. CJ Richardson understood
and accepted, even embraced, his responsibility. He knew that he and his
fellow jurists had the opportunity to make major changes, and he grasped that
opportunity.
Working closely with the other members of the court, CJ Richardson helped
to reincorporate Native Hawaiian tradition and custom into state law and
expanded public rights. His decisions show his successful efforts to balance
competing factors: the past and the future; Western law and Hawaiian law and
tradition; the rights of the individual and the rights of the collective; and public
and private interests.
At times, this new yet old way of thinking drew criticism from government
officials and the legal profession, but it has become recognized as an
enlightened approach for our distinctive, multi-cultural homeland. Recently,
CJ Richardson reflected on his court's approach:
Hawai'i has a unique legal system, a system of laws that was originally built on
an ancient and traditional culture. While that ancient culture had largely been
displaced, nevertheless many of the underlying guiding principles remained.
During the years after the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893
and through Hawai'i's territorial period, the decisions of our highest court
reflected a primarily Western orientation and sensibility that wasn't a
comfortable fit with Hawai'i's indigenous people and its immigrant population.
We set about returning control of interpreting the law to those with deep roots in
and profound love for Hawai'i. The result can be found in the decisions of our
Supreme Court beginning after Statehood. Thus, we made a conscious effort to
look to Hawaiian custom and tradition in deciding our cases-and consistent with
Hawaiian practice, our court held that the beaches were free to all, that access to
4 Gene Hunter, Democrat Richardson Has His Heart in Hawaii, HONOLULU ADVERTISER,
Feb. 26, 1966, at Al.
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the mountains and shoreline must be provided to the people, and that water
resources could not be privately owned.5
The decisions of the Richardson court relating to water are undoubtedly the
most widely known and the most controversial. CJ Richardson did not write
the seminal water rights opinion, McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson,6 but he was
in strong agreement with the majority and defended and reaffirmed this earlier
decision in subsequent opinions. In McBryde, the court clarified Hawai'i law
and held that water flowing in natural watercourses belongs to the State. The
court concluded that in the Mihele-the conversion to fee simple titles in the
mid-i 800s-King Kamehameha III intended to reserve the right to use water to
himself as sovereign for the common good.7 No right to private ownership of
water had been conveyed with any land title grants.8 Therefore, the State, as
successor to the king, owned all waters flowing in natural watercourses and
held water in trust for the people.9 The McBryde decision also pointed to the
1850 Kuleana Act, which allowed native tenants to obtain fee simple title to
land. The Kuleana Act, the court stated, guaranteed the right to "drinking
water and running water," thereby giving riparian water rights to land owners
adjoining natural watercourses.o
In 1982, in Robinson v. Ariyoshi," CJ Richardson responded to six questions
certified by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in appeals related to the
McBryde decision. Robinson provided important clarifications regarding water
law in Hawai'i, including strongly reaffirming the role of the public trust
doctrine in both traditional Hawaiian and modem usage. Robinson reiterated
that the McBryde decision clarified ambiguous aspects of Hawai'i water law
and did not depart from settled legal principles.12 It was also instrumental in
affirming the role of the riparian doctrine in Hawai'i water law.
CJ Richardson decided a second important water rights case the same year.
Reppun v. Board of Water Supply' 3 involved a dispute over the water in
Waihe'e Stream on O'ahu and the impact of the Board of Water Supply's wells
on the rights of downstream kalo (taro) farmers. The court's opinion helped
William S. Richardson, Spirit of Excellence Award Acceptance Speech at the ABA Spirit
of Excellence Awards Luncheon (Miami, Fla., February 10, 2007).
6 54 Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (Abe, J.), aff'don reh'g, 55 Haw. 260,517 P.2d 26 (1973)
(per curiam).
7 Id. at 185-87, 504 P.2d at 1338-39.
8 Id
9 Id.
'o Id. at 191-99, 504 P.2d at 1341-45.
' 65 Haw. 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982).
12 Id. at 673-76, 658 P.2d at 309-12.
'3 65 Haw. 531, 656 P.2d 57 (1982).
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explain the doctrines of appurtenant and riparian rights, including whether such
rights may be transferred or extinguished.
CJ Richardson has identified In re Ashfordl4 as the decision of which he was
most proud and the one that he believed had the most significant impact. In
Ashford, the court was called upon to determine the boundary between public
beaches and private property. At issue was an original grant from the Mhele
describing the shoreline boundary using the phrase "ma ke kai," or "along the
sea."15 The meaning of this term was established in Ashford, when the court
allowed kama'dina witness testimony' 6 on the location of shoreline boundaries
according to ancient Hawaiian tradition, custom, and usage. The court then
determined that based on Hawaiian custom and usage, seaward boundaries
described as "ma ke kai" are located along the upper reaches of the wash of
waves, as evidenced by the edge of vegetation or line of debris left by the wash
of waves.' 7
In two subsequent cases, County of Hawaii v. Sotomura and In re
Sanborn,'9 the court affirmed and refined the Ashford decision. In Sotomura,
the court applied the Ashford standard to property that had been registered in
Land Court and also determined that where seaward boundaries are evidenced
by both a debris line and a vegetation line lying further mauka, or inland, the
boundary is presumed to be at the vegetation line.20 This meant that more of
the beach would be available for public use and the court specifically noted that
"[p]ublic policy .. . favors extending to public use and ownership as much of
Hawaii's shoreline as is reasonably possible." 21 In Sanborn, another case
involving property registered in Land Court, the Hawai'i Supreme Court
reaffirmed its earlier holdings and also ruled that in construing land court
decrees, natural monuments such as "along the high water mark" are
controlling over azimuth and distance measurements.2 2 Citing Sotomura, the
court stated, "land below high water mark is held in public trust by the State,
whose ownership may not be relinquished, except where relinquishment is
consistent with certain public purposes." 23
14 50 Haw. 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968).
" Id. at 314, 440 P.2d at 77.
16 In a footnote, the court quoted an earlier Hawai'i case to define a kama'dina witness as "a
person familiar from childhood with any locality." Id. at 315 n.2, 440 P.2d at 77 n.2 (quotingln
re Boundaries of Pulehunui, 4 Haw. 239, 245 (1879)).
17 Id. at 315, 440 P.2d at 77.
" 55 Haw. 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973).
'9 57 Haw. 585, 562 P.2d 771 (1977).
20 Sotomura, 55 Haw. at 182, 517 P.2d at 62.
21 Id. at 189, 517 P.2d at 66.
22 Sanborn, 57 Haw. at 590, 562 P.2d at 774.
23 Id. at 593-94, 562 P.2d at 776 (quoting Sotomura, 55 Haw. at 183-84, 517 P.2d at 63).
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In another landmark case, State ex rel. Kobayashi v. Zimring,24 the court was
called upon to resolve a dispute over whether new lands created by a lava flow
were public or private property. After a detailed examination of the Mihele
and the State Admission Act, as well as Hawaiian precedent, to determine how
lava extensions were treated under Hawaiian custom and applicable law, CJ
Richardson held that lands created by lava extensions are owned by the State of
Hawai'i. 2 5 Finding no prior Hawaiian custom or judicial precedent, he
reasoned that "equity and sound public policy demand that such land inure to
the benefit of all the people of Hawaii, in whose behalf the government acts as
trustee ... . Thus we hold that lava extensions vest when created in the people
of Hawaii, held in public trust by the government for the benefit, use and
enjoyment of all the people."26
Two other decisions further demonstrate the Richardson court's view that
resources should be held for the benefit of the public. In the 1966 case In re
Robinson, the court held that a reservation of the government's rights to "all
mineral or metallic mines, of every description," in a royal patent controlled
even where the original Land Commission Award did not contain the
reservation.27 Two years later, the court decided In re Kelley, holding that a
private road, abandoned to the government prior to an 1892 act designating all
trails, roads and highways as public, automatically became a public highway
28
upon passage of the act-even without formal acceptance by the government.
It would be a mistake to conclude, however, that the Richardson court always
acted to give resources to the public. In the 1978 case In re Kamakana, the
justices looked to Hawaiian practice and custom to determine that the grant of
an ahupua'a, a traditional Hawaiian land unit, would naturally include the
fishpond attached to the ahupua'a.29  The court reasoned that because
Hawaiians viewed fishponds in the same way that they viewed 'dina or land,
the private claimant, not the State, owned a Moloka'i fishpond.o In another
case decided the same year, United Congregational Churches v. Kamamalu,
the court established that continuous occupation of state lands by the churches
afforded them an equitable right to use the property, until abandoned, for those
purposes.
24 58 Haw. 106, 566 P.2d 725 (1977).
25 Id. at 124-25, 566 P.2d at 736-38.
26 Id. at 121, 566 P.2d at 735 (citations omitted).
27 49 Haw. 429, 440-41, 421 P.2d 570, 577-78 (1966).
28 50 Haw. 567, 579-80, 445 P.2d 538, 546-47 (1968).
29 58 Haw. 632, 640-41, 574 P.2d 1346, 1350-51 (1978).
30 Id. at 638-41, 574 P.2d at 1349-5 1.
31 59 Haw. 334, 341-43, 582 P.2d 208, 213-14 (1978).
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CJ Richardson also expressed concern for the loss of Hawaiian lands through
adverse possession. In Yin v. Midkiff 2 and City and County of Honolulu v.
Bennett,33 his court determined that a co-tenant must show good faith in
adversely possessing property. In most instances, CJ Richardson noted, the
requirement of good faith in turn mandates that the tenant acting adversely
must actually notify co-tenants of the claim against them.34 The court
acknowledged that there may be exceptional circumstances where good faith is
satisfied by less than actual notice, but this basic good faith requirement has
remained the standard for adverse possession claims against co-tenants in
Hawai' i.36
In another key decision, CJ Richardson set forth the standard by which state
actions should be judged when dealing with beneficiaries of the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act,37 a law establishing homestead lands for Native
Hawaiians of not less than fifty percent Hawaiian ancestry. In Ahuna v.
Department ofHawaiian Home Lands, the court drew the analogy between the
federal government's relationship with Native American peoples and the
State's relationship with Hawaiian home lands beneficiaries, declaring that the
State must "adhere to high fiduciary duties normally owed by a trustee to its
beneficiaries."38 CJ's opinion added that the State should thus be judged by
"the most exacting fiduciary standards."39 These duties included the duty to act
solely in the interests of the beneficiaries and to exercise reasonable care and
skill in dealing with trust property.4 0
The lasting value of the Ahuna court's explication of these trust duties is
evident in current Hawai'i case law. The Hawai'i Supreme Court has adopted
the Ahuna standard in two landmark caseS4' related to the public land trust, the
former Hawaiian Kingdom Government and Crown Lands ceded to the United
States by the Republic of Hawai'i in 1898 and then transferred to the State of
Hawai'i in the 1959 Admission Act. The court has applied these same strict
32 52 Haw. 537, 481 P.2d 109 (1971).
3 57 Haw. 195, 552 P.2d 1380 (1976).
34 Id. at 209-10, 552 P.2d at 1390.
35 Id.
36 See Wailuku Agribusiness Co. v. Ah Sam, 114 Haw. 24,34, 155 P.3d 1125, 1135 (2007);
Morinoue v. Roy, 86 Haw. 76, 82-83, 947 P.2d 944, 950-51 (1997); Hana Ranch v. Kanakaole,
66 Haw. 643, 645-46, 672 P.2d 550, 551-52 (1983).
1 42 Stat. 108 (1921), reprinted in 1 HAw. REv. STAT. 261 (2009).
3 64 Haw. 327, 338, 640 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1982).
3 Id. at 339, 640 P.2d at 1169 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286,
297 (1942)) (emphasis omitted).
40 Id. at 340, 640 P.2d at 1169.
41 Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578,605 n.18,837 P.2d 1247, 1274 n.18(1992); Office
of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw., 117 Haw. 174, 195, 177 P.3d 884,
905 (2008), rev'd sub nom. Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009).
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fiduciary standards to the State's dealings with public trust lands, stating that
"such duty is consistent with the State's obligation to use reasonable skill and
care in managing the public lands trust" and that the State's conduct should be
judged "by the most exacting fiduciary standards."42
CJ Richardson once again looked to early Hawaiian law and custom in
Palama v. Sheehan.43 In Palama, his opinion found a right of access to a
kuleana parcel based, in part, on language in early Hawai'i deeds reserving the
rights of native tenants as well as the 1850 Kuleana Act's provision reserving
the "right of way" on all lands granted in fee simple." The decision also relied
on kama'aina testimony in the trial court showing that the road was an ancient
Hawaiian right of way.45
Turning to Hawaiian custom and practice again, and bolstered by a 1978
amendment to the Hawai'i State Constitution, CJ Richardson's 1982 decision
in Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co.,46 dealing with Native Hawaiian gathering
rights, broke new ground. The court stated that pursuant to article XII, section
7 of the amended constitution, courts are obligated "to preserve and enforce
such traditional rights."47 Recognizing that gathering rights are protected by
three sources in Hawai'i law-Hawai'i Revised Statutes (H.R.S.) sections 1-1
and 7-1, and article XII, section 7 of the Hawai'i State Constitution-the court
determined that lawful residents of an ahupua'a may, for the purpose of
practicing Native Hawaiian customs and traditions, enter undeveloped lands
within the ahupua'a to gather the items enumerated in H.R.S. section 7-1.4
The court further stated that H.R.S. section 1-1 ensures the continuation of
Native Hawaiian customs and traditions not specifically enumerated in H.R.S.
section 7-1 that may have been practiced in certain ahupua'a "for so long as no
actual harm is done thereby."49 It noted that the "retention of a Hawaiian
tradition should in each case be determined by balancing the respective
interests and harm once it is established that the application of the custom has
continued in a particular area."50
The Kalipi decision set the foundation for more recent cases affirming
traditional and customary rights. Ten years after Kalipi, the Hawai'i Supreme
Court, in Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, recognized that "native Hawaiian rights
42 Office ofHawaiian Affairs, 117 Haw. at 195, 177 P.3d at 905 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
43 50 Haw. 298, 440 P.2d 95 (1968).
4 See id. at 300, 440 P.2d at 97.
45 Id. at 301, 440 P.2d at 97-98.
46 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982).
47 Id. at 4, 656 P.2d at 748.
48 Id. at 7-8, 656 P.2d at 749.
49 Id. at 10, 656 P.2d at 751.
50 Id.
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protected by article XII, section 7 [of the Hawai'i Constitution] may extend
beyond the ahupua'a in which a native Hawaiian resides where such rights have
been customarily and traditionally exercised in this manner."51 The court
explained that although Kalipi had gathering rights under H.R.S. section 7-1
limited to the ahupua'a in which he lived as a native tenant, H.R.S. section 1-
l's "'Hawaiian usage' clause may establish certain customary Hawaiian rights
beyond those found in section 7-1."s2 In 1995, in Public Access Shoreline
Hawaii v. Hawai'i County Planning Commission (PASH), the court rejected
the argument that gathering rights disappear when an owner develops land,
holding instead that the State is obligated to protect the reasonable exercise of
traditional and customary rights to the extent feasible.53 The court based its
decision on H.R.S. section 1-1, tracing its origins to an 1847 law authorizing
the adoption of common law principles "not in conflict with the laws and
usages of this kingdom." 54 The PASH court further stressed, "the precise
nature and scope of the rights retained by [H.R.S.] § 1-1 ... depend upon the
particular circumstances of each case"55 and noted that Kalipi specifically
refused to decide the "ultimate scope" of traditional rights under that statute. 6
Two decisions of the Richardson era illustrate the court's general approach to
public education. In Spears v. Honda, a 1968 case, the court ruled that the
State lacked the constitutional authority to use public funds to provide bus
transportation subsidies for sectarian and private school students.57 In
Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, decided in 1970, the court found that the use of a family
life and sex education film series in a non-compulsory state sex education
program did not contravene the right of privacy and autonomy claimed by
parents.5 8
The court was frequently called upon to decide cases relating to the rights of
the electorate. In the 1969 case Akizaki v. Fong, the court determined that the
commingling of valid and invalid absentee ballots invalidated the election
results for a representative to the State House, necessitating another election.59
In County ofKauai v. Pacific Standard Life Insurance Co., the court resolved
"a conflict between the private interest of the landowners to develop their
s" 73 Haw. 578, 620, 837 P.2d 1247, 1272 (1992).
52 Id. at 618, 837 P.2d at 1275 (citing Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 9-10, 656 P.2d at 750).
s3 79 Haw. 425,448-49,903 P.2d 1246, 1269-70 (1995) (holding that "common law rights
ordinarily associated with tenancy do not limit customary rights existing under the laws of this
state") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
54 Id. at 437 n.21, 903 P.2d at 1258 n.21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
s Id. at 438, 440, 903 P.2d at 1259, 1261 (citing Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. at 619,
837 P.2d at 1271) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56 Id. at 439, 903 P.2d at 1260.
5 51 Haw. 1, 15-16, 449 P.2d 130, 139 (1968).
58 52 Haw. 436, 438-41, 478 P.2d 314, 315-17 (1970).
s9 51 Haw. 354, 360, 461 P.2d 221, 224-25 (1968).
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property and the public interest of the electorate to effectively determine ...
land use policy." 0 The court held for the electorate and determined that zoning
estoppel does not apply where certification of a prohibiting referendum
precedes final discretionary action by the government.
The Richardson court also opened the way for greater public access to both
the administrative process and the courts. In Life of the Land v. Land Use
Commission62 and later in Akau v. Olohana,6 3 the court adopted progressive
standing requirements, allowing organizations and individuals to challenge land
use decisions and to assert environmental and other important public rights.
Since their initial adoption, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has consistently
reaffirmed these standing requirements in cases involving environmental and
public rights.6
Consistent with CJ Richardson's concern for working people, his court
liberally interpreted the statutory presumption in favor of a causal connection
between employment activity and an employee's death in Akamine v. Hawaiian
Packing & Crating Co.65 According to CJ Richardson, it was legally irrelevant
that an employee's heart attack, which occurred at work, could just as easily
have occurred when the employee was not working: "The only [legal]
consideration should have been whether the attack in fact was aggravated or
accelerated by . .. work activity."66
Finally, in another important series of cases, the Hawai'i Supreme Court
examined negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. In the 1970 case
Rodrigues v. State, the court had to decide if the plaintiff could recover for
emotional distress when his newly-built house was flooded after the State failed
to clear a drainage culvert. The court determined that "the interest in freedom
from negligent infliction of serious mental distress is entitled to independent
legal protection"68 and held that "there is a duty to refrain from the negligent
infliction of serious mental distress."6 9 The duty, however, runs "only to those
60 65 Haw. 318, 323, 653 P.2d 766, 771 (1982).
6! Id. at 335-36, 653 P.2d at 778-79.
62 61 Haw. 3, 594 P.2d 1079 (1979).
63 65 Haw. 383, 653 P.2d 1130 (1982).
64 Cases citing Life ofthe Land include E & JLounge Operating Co. v. Liquor Commission
of City & County ofHonolulu, 118 Haw. 320, 346, 189 P.3d 432, 458 (2008), and Ka Pa'akai
OKa 'Aina v. Land Use Commission, 94 Haw. 31,43, 7 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2000); cases citing
Akau include Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Housing & Community Development Corp. of
Hawai'i, 121 Haw. 324, 331, 219 P.3d 1111, 1118 (2009), and Sierra Club v. Department of
Transportation (Superferry l), 115 Haw. 299, 314, 167 P.3d 292, 321 (2007).
6s 53 Haw. 406, 495 P.2d 1164 (1972).
6 Id. at 413, 495 P.2d at 1169.
67 52 Haw. 156, 157-61, 472 P.2d 509, 512-14 (1970).
61 Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520 (emphasis added).
69 Id.
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who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those
risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous."70
Four years later, in Leong v. Takasaki, by looking to the concepts of 'ohana
(extended family) and ho'okama (a form of customary adoption), CJ
Richardson found that a blood relationship may not be necessary in order to
recover for emotional distress caused by seeing a step-grandmother hit by a
car." His opinion stated: "Hawaiian and Asian families of this state have long
maintained strong ties among members of the same extended family group.
The Hawaiian word ohana has been used to express this concept."7 2 In 1975,
CJ Richardson dissented in Kelley v. Kokua Sales, another case involving the
bounds of liability in negligent infliction of serious mental distress cases. He
argued eloquently against the majority's retreat from the precedent set by
Rodrigues.74
Necessarily, any review of CJ Richardson's judicial opinions can give only a
hint of his enormous influence. It does not begin to touch upon the
extraordinary personal qualities-his optimism, his empathy, his uniquely
generous blend of heart and spirit and head, his warmth and humor, and his rare
common sense-that are so securely anchored in the land and people of
Hawai'i. It also cannot convey how CJ Richardson's many deeds, stretching
far beyond his judicial opinions, have greatly influenced and improved Hawai'i
as well as the world beyond our shores.
For the law school's 2005 graduation ceremony, graduate Kahikino Noa
Dettweiler wrote and presented an Oli Aloha, a chant honoring CJ
Richardson. As Noa explained, the chant compares CJ Richardson to the
lehua blossom, a poetic reference for a person of profound skill and wisdom.76
The Oli Aloha alludes to Kamehameha's Law of the Splintered Paddle, the
law that declared: "Let the old men, the old women and the children go and
sleep by the wayside; let them be not molested."77 Although there are several
versions of the mo'olelo (story) about this law, they all recount that some of
70 Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 521.
7 55 Haw. 398, 410-11, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (1974).
72 Id. at 410, 520 P.2d at 766.
7 56 Haw. 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975).
74 See id. at 210-14, 532 P.2d at 677-79 (Richardson, C.J., dissenting).
7s See Kahikino Noa Dettweiler, OliAloha No William S. Richardson, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 1
(2010).
76 Id.
7 PUKui, supra note 1, at 35.
78 See SAMUEL M. KAMAKAU, RULING CHIEFS OF HAWAII 125-26 (rev. ed. 1992); W.D.
WESTERVELT, HAWAIIAN HISTORICAL LEGENDS 162-175 (1923); JULIE STEWART WILLIAMS,
KAMEHAMEHA THE GREAT 58-59, 86-87 (rev. ed. 1993); see also STEPHEN L. DESHA,
KAMEHAMEHA AND HIS WARRIOR KEKOHAUPI'O 205-16 (Frances N. Frazier trans., 2000), for a
complete account of one version of the mo'olelo along with a summary of several other
14
2010 / KALAMAKLOKANO'EAU
the common people of Puna were fishing when the young chief Kamehameha
came upon them.79 Knowing only that a stranger and a chief approached, the
men feared trouble and fled; Kamehameha pursued. When Kamehameha's
ankle was caught in a lava crevice, Kaleleiki, one of the fishermen, turned back
and with his paddle, hit Kamehameha on the head, splitting the paddle in two.80
Years later, when Kaleleiki and his companions were brought before
Kamehameha for punishment, instead of putting them to death, Kamehameha
recognized his own responsibility in causing the incident.8' He proclaimed the
Law of the Splintered Paddle, protecting even the most defenseless from
oppression by those with more power and authority.82
Thus, in Noa's tribute to CJ Richardson, I was reminded that the law
school's graduates fulfill CJ Richardson's highest aspirations for us when we
protect those who are powerless from those who have power, when we fight for
those who lack economic security and life's basic necessities, and when we
seek justice for Hawai'i's native people and, indeed, for all people in our
homeland.
But for CJ Richardson's endeavors, so many of us would have lacked the
opportunity to learn the law and to seek justice through its practice. Without
our beloved CJ, we would have had no such compelling embodiment of a life
well lived-and lived with exemplary grace and humble nobility.
Ka Lama Ki 0 Ka No'eau-the standing torch of wisdom. Indeed!
versions.
7 DESHA, supra note 78, at 206-07; WESTERVELT, supra note 78, at 167-68; WILLIAMS,
supra note 78, at 58.
80 DESHA, supra note 78, at 208-09.
8' WESTERVELT, supra note 78, at 174-75; WILLIAMS, supra note 78, at 86-87.
82 WILLIAMS, supra note 78, at 86-87; DESHA, supra note 78, at 216.
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